

Message Text

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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9244
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4813
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSNAVEUR

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SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEW OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES

USNMR SHAPE FOR POLAD
USCINCUEUR FOR POLAD
CINCUSAREUR FOR POLAD
CINCUSAFE FOR POLAD
CINCUSNAVEUR FOR POLAD

MISSION BELIEVES DEPARTMENT WILL FIND THE FOLLOWING INFORMAL
TRANSLATION OF ARTICLE FROM THE OCTOBER 1974 EDITION OF "DEFENSE
NATIONALE" OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST. THE AUTHOR IS ANONYMOUS; BUT
PUBLICATION OF THE ARTICLE IN THIS MAGAZINE GIVES IT WEIGHT AND IT
HAS ATTRACTED ATTENTION AMONG THE DELEGATIONS AT NATO:RR
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BEGIN TEXT

AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES EMPLOYMENT POLICY
AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

INTRODUCTION. THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT THIS YEAR IN THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES. ACCORDING TO MR. SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENT LAST JANUARY, THESE FORCES WILL NO LONGER THREATEN ONLY OR ESSENTIALLY THE ENEMY'S POPULATION CENTERS, BUT ALSO HIS NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. DOES THIS NEW OPTION REINFORCE OR WEAKEN DETERRENCE? WHAT ARE ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AND WHAT ARE ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS? THE AUTHOR, WHO IS VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALLIED AND FRENCH STRATEGIC MATTERS, ANSWERS THESE QUESTIONS. END INTRODUCTION.

THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, ANNOUNCED ON 10 JANUARY 1974 CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS IN U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT POLICY. THESE WEAPONS, UNTIL RECENTLY TARGETED AGAINST A POTENTIAL ENEMY'S URBAN CENTERS, WOULD, IN CASE OF A FUTURE CONFLICT, BE TARGETED AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION OR ITS ALLIES AS WELL. IMMEDIATELY, AS IS NORMAL IN THE UNITED STATES, A DEBATE DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE MANY KNOWLEDGEABLE STRATEGISTS WHO STUDY NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT POLICY. DID THIS CHANGE REINFORCE DETERRENCE AND THEREBY STABILIZE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, OR WAS ITS EFFECT, ON THE CONTRARY, THAT OF ENDING THE SANCITY OF RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN TERRITORY, THUS REDUCING THE IRRATIONALITY OF THE NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES?

IN EUROPE, THE QUESTION DID NOT CREATE SUCH A STIR. IT IS, HOWEVER, VERY IMPORTANT TO THE SECURITY OF THE OLD CONTINENT. STUDYING THE DEBATES AND THE MANY EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS LEADS TO A RATHER CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE MOTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS WHICH LED WASHINGTON TO THESE DECISIONS. FIRST, WE SHALL ATTEMPT TO SUMMARIZE THE DATA PUBLISHED. THEN, WE SHALL ATTEMPT TO EVALUATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE DECISIONS FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE.

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GENERAL PROBLEMS IN DEFENSE

THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES IS TWOFOLD. THESE FORCES MUST:

A. DETER AN ENEMY FROM ANY NUCLEAR ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES AND, TO SOME EXTENT, FROM ANY MASSIVE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK;

B. RETALIATE SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL.

THE PROGRESSIVE ESTABLISHMENT DURING THE LAST DECADE OF A BALANCE BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. AND THE USSR, WHICH CAUSED THE ADOPTION OF THE CONCEPT OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, HAD ALREADY

LED WASHINGTON TO ASSIGN CERTAIN COUNTER-FORCE MISSIONS TO ITS MISSILES AND BOMBERS. BUT ONLY DURING THE LAST FEW YEARS DID EVENTS OCCUR WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT A RATHER IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE SITUATION AND IN EMPLOYMENT POLICY SO THAT IT BECAME A SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO U.S. PUBLIC OPINION, TO THE ALLIES, AND DOUBTLESS EVEN MORE, TO THE ENEMY'S LEADERS.

THESE EVENTS ARE, BASICALLY, THE SALT AGREEMENT IN MAY 1972, AND THE ARMAMENT PROGRAM AND TECHNICAL ADVANCES OF THE USSR.

SALT, BY ESTABLISHING A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATION ON ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEMS, RATIFIED THE MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF THE IDEA OF PROTECTING AGAINST THE OPPONENT'S MISSILES. FOR OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, IT RATIFIED A SUPERIORITY FOR THE USSR IN THE NUMBER OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBM), SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBM) AND NUCLEAR SUBMARINES, WITH THE INFERIORITY IN NUMBERS OF U.S. DELIVERY SYSTEMS BEING MORE THAN COMPENSTATED BY U.S. SUPERIORITY IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS, SINCE THE U.S. MISSILES ARE FITTED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY-TARGETED RE-ENTRY VEHICLES (MIRV).

BUTBY 1973 THE SOVIET UNION HAD MASTERED THIS TYPE WARHEAD FOR ITS ICBMS AND IS NOW PURSUING A VIGOROUS DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM FOR FOUR NEW TYPES OF MISSILES WHICH WOULD GIVE IT A LOAD CAPACITY EVALUATED AT 7000 WARHEADS
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OF 1 TO 2 MEGATONS. THE RESULT IS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, LAND BASED ICBM SYSTEM(1).

FOOTNOTE (1). SOVIET EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS ARE DEVELOPING ALSO IN OTHER DIRECTIONS: MOBILE MISSILES, LAUNCH SYSTEMS PERMITTING REPEATED USE OF THE SAME SILO, COMMISSIONING OF THE DELTA SUBMARINE, APPEARANCE OF A BOMBER WITH AN INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE, ETC. END FOOTNOTE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9245
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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4814
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USNMR SHAPE
CUSCINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR
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OBTAINING, WASHINGTON HAS NOT REMAINED IDLE. ITS
EFFECT HAS APPEARED IN THE FOLLOWING THREE AREAS:
-IMPROVEMENTS IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS (MISSILES, SUB-
MARINES, BOMBERS, WARHEADS...) AS WELL AS DEFENSIVE WEAPONS
(HARDENING OF SILOS, RADARS...) AND AFFIRMATION OF THE
DETERMINATION NOT TO ALLOW THE OTHER SIDE TO ACHIEVE
NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF WARHEADS.

-SEARCH, IN THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS, FOR AN "ESSENTIAL
EQUIVALENCE" WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT QUALITATIVE AND QUANTI-
TATIVE FACTORS, I.E., THE NUMBER OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND
THEIR THROW WEIGHT..

-FINALLY, RETARGETING THE STRATEGIC FORCES.

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THIS IS THE QUESTION WHICH INTERESTS US HERE. THIS
CHANGE, AS WE HAVE ALREADY SAID, CONSISTS OF TARGETING
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS, NUCLEAR
(SILOS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE SITES) AS WELL AS CONVENTION-
AL (COMMAND POSTS, AIRFIELDS, COMMUNICATIONS CENTERS, PORTS
OR EVEN ARMED FORCES). IT DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY DECREASES IN
THE COUNTER-CITY CAPABILITY OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES. BUT,
BESIDES THEIR RETALIATION MISSION, THESE FORCES WILL NOW BE
ABLE TO ATTACK ENEMY FORCES.

THIS DEVELOPMENT IS BASED ON CERTAIN TECHNICAL FACTORS
SUCH AS BETTER TARGET ACQUISITION DUE TO SATELLITE OBSERVATION;
GREATER PRECISION IN WEAPON DELIVERY PERMITTING USE OF
SMALLER WARHEADS WHICH REDUCES PROPORTIONATELY THE RISK OF
COLLATERAL DAMAGE; THE POSSIBILITY OF PROGRAMMING SEVERAL
MISSIONS INTO THE GUIDANCE SYSTEM AND SELECTING ONE APPRO-
PRIATE TO THE FORM OF CONFLICT AT THE MOMENT OF LAUNCH;
FINALLY, THE SUPER-ABUNDANCE OF WEAPONS IN COMPARISON TO THE
TARGETS, DUE TO THE MIRVs, AND THE ABANDONMENT OF ANTI-MISSILE

DEFENSE SINCE SALT I. THESE SAME FACTORS, TO SOME EXTENT, ALSO INFLUENCE THE USSR.

THE TECHNICAL FACTORS THUS PERMITTED A DECISION CLEARLY DICTATED BY THE POLITICO-STRATEGIC NOTION THAT, FOR LESS THAN MASSIVE NUCLEAR ATTACK, THE UNITED STATES MUST NOT BE FORCED TO RETALIATE BY DESTROYING ENEMY CITIES WHICH WOULD, IN TURN BRING ABOUT DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CITIES.

IF EITHER ALLIES OR THE ENEMY DOUBTS THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH RETALIATION AGAINST URBAN CENTERS, DETERRENCE IS WEAKENED. THIS IS OBVIOUS. THEREFORE, SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE THIS LIMITED ATTACK CAPABILITY, THE UNITED STATES MUST HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO RESPOND AT THE SAME LEVEL.

FOR DETERRENCE TO BE CREDIBLE IS A SITUATION PROVIDING A GREAT VARIETY OF OPTIONS TO THE ENEMY, AND THUS EFFECTIVE IT MUST REST ON A WIDE RANGE OF RETALIATORY OPTIONS. ONE OF THE GOALS OF THE MILITARY ART HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO PRESENT THE ENEMY WITH SITUATIONS FOR WHICH HE IS NOT PREPARED; IT IS THUS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT DEFENSE PLANNERS ANALYZE THE OPPORTUNITIES HIS OWN FORCES AFFORD TO THE ENEMY AND ANTICIPATE UNCLASSIFIED

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HIS RESPONSE.

LET'S US POINT OUT, FOR AMERICAN DEFENSE PLANNERS INSIST ON THIS POINT, THAT IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF TRYING TO ACHIEVE A FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY, I.E., THE ABILITY TO DESTROY ALL THE OPPONENT'S OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES WITH A MASSIVE ATTACK. NEITHER OF THE GREAT POWERS CAN EXPECT TO ACHIEVE THIS, IF ONLY BECAUSE THE SUBMARINES COULD NOT BE KNOCKED OUT AT THE SAME TIME, AND THE VICTIM OF THE INITIAL STRIKE WOULD RETAIN, THANKS TO THE SUBMARINES, THE ABILITY TO DESTROY THE AGGRESSOR'S CITIES AND INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL.

THIS NEW POLICY THUS CONSTITUTES AN EXTENSION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO THE BILATERAL STRATEGIC FIELD. BUT WHILE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE APPLIED TO EUROPE TENDED TO MAKE A SANCTUARY OF THE TERRITORY OF THE TWO GREAT POWERS, THIS EXTENSION OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES' MISSIONS SPREADS A CREDIBLE THREAT TO THEIR TERRITORY BECAUSE IT LIMITS DESTRUCTIVENESS AND PERMITS SELECTIVE TARGETING.

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

AFTER HAVING SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO A SOVIET THREAT WITH A THREAT OF SIMILAR NATURE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN MUTUAL HOLOCAUST AND INACTION AFTER ANY ENEMY ATTACK, MR. SCHLESINGER, IN HIS ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR 1975, GIVES ANOTHER REASON FOR THE POLICY HE INSTITUTED: "WE DO NOT PROPOSE" HE SAID, "TO

SEE AN ENEMY THREATEN ONE OR MORE OF OUR ALLIES WITH HIS NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN THE EXPECTATION THAT WE WOULD LACK THE FLEXIBILITY AND WILL TO STRIKE BACK AT HIS ASSETS (AND THOSE OF ANY COUNTRIES SUPPORTING THE THREAT) IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE HIS EFFORT BOTH HIGH IN COST AND ULTIMATELY UNSUCCESSFUL".

CONSEQUENTLY, IT APPEARS THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES BELIEVE THAT THESE ANNOUNCED DECISIONS CONSTITUTE A REINFORCEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES' NUCLEAR GUARANTEE TO ITS ALLIES AND ENHANCE DETERRENCE. THIS IDEA SHOULD BE ANALYZED.

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AS WE KNOW, THE DEFENSE DOCTRINE FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS CHANGED FROM THE CONCEPT OF MASSIVE RETALIATION TO THAT OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. FRANCE, HAVING LEFT THE INTEGRATED SYSTEM IN THE MEANTIME, DIDNOT ACCEPT THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOCTRINE; NO DOUBT FRANCE THOUGHT THAT DURING MILITARY CONFLICT A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY WOULD RESULT IN THE RISK OF:

A. ESTABLISHING A BREAK BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN THEATER AND THE TERRITORIES OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, AND

B. INABILITY TO COORDINATE THE USE OF FORCES DEVOTED TO TACTICAL MISSIONS AND FORCES BELONGING TO THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

WITHOUT DEBATING HERE THE VALIDITY OF THIS CRITICISM, IT APPEARS THAT THE NW POLICY BLURS THIS TERRITORIAL DISTINCTION AND PERMITS COORDINATED USE, SINCE THE FORCES BELONGING TO THE U.S. CENTRAL SYSTEM CAN BE TARGETED AGAINST TACTICAL TAGETS LOCATED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF.

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4815
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
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A PARAGRAPH IN THE OTTAWA DECLARATION, ADOPTED DURING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE'S 25TH ANNIVERSARY, STATES THAT SINCE STRATEGIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE REACHED A STATUS OF QUASI-EQUILIBRIUM, THE PROBLEM OF EUROPE'S DEFENSE ASSUMES A SPECIAL CHARACTER. UNDOUBTEDLY, THE PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT IS TO POINT OUT THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES IS VULNERABLE ONLY TO THE USE OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS WHICH WOULD IMMEDIATELY PROVOKE RETALIATION AT THE SAME LEVEL, EUROPE IS VULNERABLE TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES, CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND EVEN TO POLITICAL PRESSURE IF IT DOES NOT BELIEVE ITSELF TO BE EFFECTIVELY DEFENDED.

THE AMERICAN DECISIONS ARE CERTAINLY NOT SUCH AS TO MODIFY THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF EUROPE'S DEFENSE. BUT IF UNCLASSIFIED

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THESE DECISIONS MEAN THAT IN CASE OF A CONFLICT ON OUR CONTINENT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY TARGETS, ONE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE INVIOABILITY OF THE TWO GREAT POWERS' TERRITORY WHICH THE SALT AGREEMENTS SEEM TO HAVE RATIFIED IS DIMINISHED; THIS INVIOABILITY BEING, PERHAPS, REDUCED TO PROTECTION OF POPULATION CENTERS.

FINALLY, IF ONE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WERE CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS A STRONG PRESUMPTION THE UNITED STATES MIGHT ESCALATE TO THE STRATEGIC LEVEL IN CASE OF EVEN A LIMITED CONFLICT IN EUROPE, ONE WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE AMERICAN DECISIONS WEAKEN DETERRENCE, AND THUS OUR SECURITY.

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE THOUGHT A UNITED STATES STRATEGIC ATTACK AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WAS HARDLY CREDIBLE IN THIS SAME SITUATION, THE DECISIONS ANNOUNCED BY WASHINGTON OFFER THE ENEMY A PLAUSIBLE THREAT OF AN ATTACK ON HIS TERRITORY BY THE U.S. CENTRAL SYSTEMS. A NEW RUNG

HAS JUST BEEN ADDED TO THE LADDER WHICH INCREASES THE DANGER OF ESCALATION HANGING OVER ANY CONFLICT. THERE IS, THUS, A PARTIAL OVERLAPPING BETWEEN THE MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO THE WEAPONS OF FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS, OR THEATER FORCES, AND THE WEAPONS OF THE CENTRAL SYSTEM, SINCE BOTH MAY ATTACK TACTICAL TARGETS. JUDGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SITUATION IS SIMPLIFIED IF ONE CONSIDERS WHAT THE SITUATION MIGHT HAVE BEEN IF THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. STRATEGY HAD PROCEEDED INVERSELY. IF, FROM A CONCEPT WHICH ASSOCIATED STRATEGIC ARMS WITH THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE, WASHINGTON HAD SLID TOWARDS A DOCTRINE WHICH RESERVED THESE ARMS FOR RETALIATION ONLY IN CASE OF AN ATTACK ON U.S. CITIES, COULD ONE BELIEVE THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD HAVE SEEN THIS AS REINFORCEMENT OF THEIR SECURITY?

FOR THESE VARIOUS REASONS, ONE WILL CONCLUDE THAT MR. SCHLESINGER IS JUSTIFIED IN SAYING THAT THE DECISIONS HE HAS JUST ANNOUNCED ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES' ALLIES. THIS IS, HOWEVER, SUBJECT TO ONE SERIOUS PROVISIO WHICH AFFECTS THE FATE OF THOSE WEAPONS BELONGING TO FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS, I. E., THOSE WEAPONS LOCATED IN UNCLASSIFIED

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THE EUROPEAN THEATER AND CAPABLE OF REACHING TARGETS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

IT WOULD SEEM THAT IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIETS DEMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, THAT THESE FORWARD BASED WEAPON SYSTEMS BE INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL OF THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES--THE DEFINITION OF THE STRATEGIC WEAPON BEING, IN THE EYES OF THE RUSSIANS, ANY WEAPON CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF ONE OF THE GREAT POWERS--AND ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT THESE WEAPON SYSTEMS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM AREAS FROM WHICH THEY COULD ATTACK THE USSR. THUS, THE BALANCE BETWEEN STRATEGIC ARMS WOULD NO LONGER CONCERN ONLY ICBMS, SLBMS AND BOMBERS, BUT ALSO A GOOD NUMBER OF FIGHTER-BOMBERS STATIONED IN EUROPE AND THE AIRCRAFT CARRIED BY THE SIXTH FLEET.

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF DEFENSE OF THE OLD CONTINENT, IT IS CLEAR THAT IF THE SOVIET DEMAND WERE ACCEPTED, THE NUCLEAR BATTLEGROUND WOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE TERRITORY OF THE TWO GREAT POWERS' ALLIES. IN OTHER WORDS, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD RETAIN THE SIX OR SEVEN HUNDRED MISSILES WHICH ARE MORE THAN ENOUGH TO DESTROY ALL THE POPULATION CENTERS IN WESTERN EUROPE, THE WEST WOULD BE DEPRIVED--IN EUROPE--OF ANY MEANS OF ATTACKING TARGETS IN THE USSR (EXCEPT FOR FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS).

THE CONDITION TO WHICH WE HAVE REFERRED NOW BECOMES OBVIOUS. SINCE THE FORWARD BASED WEAPONS SYSTEMS ARE INTENDED FOR SUPPORT MISSIONS DURING LARGE SCALE WAR ON OUR CONTINENT,

AND SINCE ANALOGOUS MISSIONS COULD BE ASSIGNED TO WEAPONS
BELONGING TO THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS, IS THERE NOT DANGER THAT
TARGETS WILL BE TRANSFERRED FROM ONE WEAPONS SYSTEM TO THE OTHER,
RESULTING IN WITHDRAWAL OF THE CAPABILITIES (DELIVERY SYSTEMS
AND WARHEADS) STATIONED IN EUROPE?

SUCH ACTION WOULD THEN ESTABLISH PERMANENTLY THE DIS-
TINCTION BETWEEN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC FORCES WHICH SEEMS SO
DANGEROUS TO OUR SECURITY. ALSO, DOES THE SECOND PHASE OF
THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS PRESENTLY UNDERWAY AFFECT EUROPEANS
MORE DIRECTLY THAN THE FIRST PHASE DID? THE AMERICAN
OFFICIALS WHO REJECT THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC
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WEAPONS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS
FORWARD BASED WEAPONS SYSTEMS AS PART OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.
THIS IS A MOST WELCOME ASSURANCE. AS CLEAR AS THE SOLIDARITY
OF THE FATES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS,
GEOGRAPHY AND THE DISPARITY OF FORCES NECESSARILY CREATE
A CERTAIN DIVERGENCE IN THE PERSPECTIVES OF EUROPEANS AND
AMERICANS CONCERNING WAYS OF PREVENTING A POTENTIAL CONFLICT.
IF, FOR THE AMERICANS, DETERRENCE IS BASED ABOVE ALL ON THE
INHERENT RISK OF A NUCLEAR ESCALATION ENTAILING AN UNACCEPTABLE
DESTRUCTION. DISCUSSIONS ON THE DESIRED LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL
FORCES AND NUCLEAR THRESHOLD, AND THE RESERVATIONS BY
SOME GOVERNMENTS THIS SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC WHICH THE U.S.
AGREEMENT OF 22 JUNE 1973 ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR
WARFARE PROVOKED, HAVE NO OTHER ORIGIN.

THE U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT WHICH WE
HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ANALYZE HERE DOES NOT SOLVE THIS PROBLEM.
BUT IT IT PRODUCES NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE PRESENCE AND
MISSIONS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEPLOYED IN WESTERN
EUROPE, IT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING THE EUROPEANS'
SENSE OF SECURITY AT ITS HIGH LEVEL.
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MOSCOW
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CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSAFE
CINCUSNAVEUR

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